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Abstract 
Personality researchers often supplement or substitute self-reports with ratings from knowledgeable 
informants, at least implicitly assuming that the same constructs are measured regardless of the 
source of ratings. However, measurement invariance (MI) of personality constructs across these 
rating types has rarely been empirically tested. Here, this was done for the Five-Factor Model 
domains and their 30 facets (N = 3,253). All facets and all domains but Agreeableness met the level 
of invariance (metric MI) required for comparing the relative standings of individuals across self-
reports and informant-ratings, which is what researchers mostly do. However, ten facets and the 
Agreeableness domain scale failed to achieve the level of invariance (scalar MI) recommended 
when comparing mean scores. In conclusion, self-reports and informant-ratings appear to measure 
similar constructs for most research purposes. 
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Do self-reports and informant-ratings measure the same personality constructs? 
Self-reports are by far the most widely used method for collecting data on individuals' personality 
differences. In fact, scores of self-report scales have been the default operationalization of the very 
concept of personality, with prominent personality models such as the Five-Factor Model (FFM; 
McCrae & John, 1992) being mostly developed and refined by analyzing the co-variance structures 
in self-reports. But a substantial body of research has also relied on alternative sources of 
information, most notably ratings provided by knowledgeable informants of the targets (i.e., people 
being rated). Often, informants provide ratings using the same questionnaires as their targets could 
use—and often do use—for providing their self-ratings.  
Supplementing self-reports with informant-ratings has a number of potential benefits (Vazire, 
2006). Using both methods simultaneously allows quantifying the extents to which personality trait 
scores reflect trait-relevant information as opposed to other effects (e.g., McCrae, 2015). Cross-rater 
agreement has been used to validate traits as capturing something real about individual differences 
as opposed to judgment biases (McCrae et al., 2004). Employing informant-ratings can enhance the 
predictive validity of personality trait scores (Kolar, Funder, & Colvin, 1996). Outcomes (i.e., 
variables outside personality domain that could be influenced by personality) are sometimes 
simultaneously predicted from both self- and informant-rated personality scores, expecting 
convergent findings to strengthen the evidence for the associations (e.g., Čukić et al., 2016). 
Developmental patterns may be cross-validated across self- and informant-ratings (e.g., Mõttus, 
Briley, Tucker-Drob et al., 2018). Using informant-ratings has also contributed towards elucidating 
the structure of personality (Tupes & Christal, 1961; Norman, 1963). 
Sometimes, informant-ratings may provide a practically more viable of collecting information about 
people’s personality than their self-reports—or even the only way. For example, by asking college 
students to rate a person they knew well, McCrae and colleagues (2005) were able to collect 
personality ratings of nearly 12,000 people of various ages from 50 cultures; it would have been 
difficult, if not impossible, to obtain personality scores for such a demographically diverse sample 
of people based on their self-ratings. Likewise, young children may be unable to provide valid self-
ratings, whereas parental ratings can be used as substitutes.  
Substituting self-ratings with informant-ratings or using them in parallel—correlating the scores 
(e.g., McCrae et al., 2004), comparing findings based on the two methods (e.g., Čukić et al., 2016; 
Mõttus et al., 2018) or aggregating them (Realo et al., 2015)—may at least implicitly rest on the 
assumption that the scores reflect the same constructs regardless of who provides the ratings. For 
example, comparing the FFM trait scores based on self- and informant-ratings typically yields 
correlations somewhere between .40 and .60 (McCrae et al., 2004). Assuming that the degrees to 
which these correlations differ from unity reflect general method effects and random error (e.g., 
McCrae, 2015), is based on the premise that the scales measure FFM traits invariantly in both rating 
types. But imperfect cross-rater agreement may also result from scales reflecting partly different 
underlying constructs in self-reports and informant-ratings. Also, finding that self- and informant-
rated personality traits correlate differently with an outcome (e.g., Čukić et al., 2016) may not 
constitute a lack of replication, but result from lack of measurement invariance (MI). 
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Indeed, there are theoretical reasons to consider the possibility of self- and informant-ratings 
reflecting somewhat different constructs or, at least, reflecting the same constructs somewhat 
differently (i.e., lack MI). Accurate personality judgments require relevant (behavioral) cues that are 
available to, and detected and utilized by, the rater (Funder, 1995). However, the trait-relevant cues 
may be differently available to the self- and even well-acquainted informant such that, for example, 
the former has more privileged access to thoughts and feelings, whereas the latter is in a better 
position to judge external (behavioral) trait manifestations (Vazire, 2010). Likewise, the ratings by 
the self and informant may be subject to different motivational biases such as self-enhancement 
(Vazire, 2010). Some personality indicators (e.g., items) may therefore be more accurately reflective 
of “true” personality in self-ratings and some in informant-ratings. Moreover, personality ratings 
may contain veridical components other than personality trait variance per se such as identity 
(readily available to the self) and reputation (readily available to informants; McAbee & Connelly, 
2016). 
When constructs have been measured using identical scales in different groups (here, rating types), 
MI can be operationalized as the equality of sets of measurement model parameters across these 
groups (Meredith, 1993). The most basic form of invariance, configural MI, is met when the 
constituents of a measurement scale (items, facets) define (or load on) the same trait in different 
rating types, whereas a more stringent form of invariance, weak or metric MI, implies that these 
loadings are also equal in size. This ensures that the scale constituents contribute to the 
operationalization of the construct to the same degree and therefore individuals are more likely to 
be ranked based on the same construct in both rating types. This level of MI is needed for 
comparing findings based on the two methods (e.g., Mõttus et al., 2018) and it facilitates the 
interpretation of cross-rater agreement (e.g., McCrae, 2004): granted metric MI, imperfect 
agreement suggest that raters have different perceptions or knowledge about target’s traits per se 
rather than scales measuring different things in different rating types. For comparing mean construct 
levels across rating types, strong or scalar MI is required, which is met when the intercepts of the 
scale constituents are also equal, in addition to loadings. Without scalar MI, mean estimates may 
correspond to different levels of scale constituents in different rating types and mean differences are 
influenced not (only) by underlying traits but (also) by their specific constituents. One can also test 
for the equality of residual variances of scale constituents (strict MI), in addition to loadings and 
intercepts; strict MI suggests that the scales measures the trait with the same level of reliability in 
both ratings types. 
The degree to which personality scale scores based on self-reports and informant-ratings display MI 
has rarely been explicitly tested. Perhaps the only study to focus on this question (Olino & Klein, 
2015), reported configural, metric and scalar invariance across rating types for all four personality 
constructs considered: Well-Being, Social Closeness, Stress Reaction and Harm Avoidance. 
However, perhaps atypically to many currently popular personality assessment instruments, the 
responses were collected using a binary, yes/no, answer format. Here we test for MI between self-
reports and informant ratings across a wide range of personality traits from different levels of 
personality trait hierarchy: the FFM domains and their 30 facets, as measured with the NEO 
Personality Inventory-3 (NEO-PI-3; McCrae & Costa, 2010), which relies on a five-point Likert 
scale response format. Evidence for MI across self- and informant-ratings would provide more 
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confidence in research making use of informant-reports or combining these with self-reports, 
whereas evidence for poor MI would also have implications for interpreting the findings of such 
research (e.g., imperfect self-informant agreement). 
Method 
Sample 
Participants constituted a subset of the Estonian Biobank cohort study, a volunteer-based sample of 
the Estonian resident adult population, recruited by general practitioners, hospital staff and using 
other means (for details see Leitsalu et al., 2014). Each participant signed an informed consent 
form.  This study uses data from 3,253 cohort members (1,917 women; mean age 46.55 years, 
standard deviation 17.02, range from 18 to 91) for whom both personality self-reports and 
informant-ratings were available.  
Measure 
Participants and their knowledgeable informants (typically a spouse/partner, parent/child or friend) 
completed the Estonian version of the NEO-PI-3 (McCrae & Costa, 2010). The NEO-PI-3 has 240 
items that measure 30 personality facets, which are then grouped into the five FFM domains, each 
including six facets consisting of eight items. The items were answered on a five-point Likert scale 
(0 = false/strongly disagree to 4 = true/strongly agree). For cross-rater correlations, see Mõttus and 
colleagues (2014). 
Analytic Strategy 
We tested for MI in the NEO-PI-3 scales as they are usually scored—each item only contributing to 
its intended scale—rather than in multi-dimensional factor models that incorporate cross-loadings 
and correlations among traits. Although MI in the multi-trait factor models may be of psychometric 
interest, it is of limited practical value, given that such models tend to fit poorly (Hopwood & 
Donnellan, 2010) and are less frequently used for actually scoring personality. Each trait was 
modeled separately. 
Separately in self-reports and informant-ratings, we started our mean and co-variance structure 
analyses by constructing a unidimensional confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) model for each facet 
and FFM domain such that facets (as latent causes) were defined by the eight items intended to 
measure them and domains (as latent causes) were defined by their respective six facets; for each 
domain, we also ran supplementary analyses where the latent domain was directly defined by the 48 
items intended to measure it (i.e., disregarding facets). Latent trait variances were fixed at unity. 
Both items and facet scores were specified as continuous variables (with interval scale) and the 
models were fit using Robust Maximum Likelihood estimator in the lavaan (Rosseel, 2012) 
package of R statistical software (R Development Core Team, 2017). We did not model item 
responses as ordered-categorical because real-world applications of the scales are mostly based on 
sum-scores, which assumes items having interval scales, and because for several items some 
response options had not been used in either rating type, creating estimation problems. As indices of 
model fit, we relied on Comparative Fit Index (CFI), Root Mean Square Error of Approximation 
(RMSEA) and Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR) . For CFI, values at least 0.95 are 
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generally desirable, whereas for RMSEA/SRMR values below 0.06/.08 are often considered as 
indicating good model fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999). Where model fit was not satisfactory due to 
residual correlations among items, item pairs that required residual correlations were identified in 
self-reports. This process was iterative, always based on the highest modification index, and as 
many item pairs were allowed to have correlated residuals as was necessary for models fit to 
become satisfactory. However, we also report the main results based on models without any 
correlated residuals. 
Next, the constructed models were fit in collapsed self- and informant-ratings, with results serving 
as the baseline for subsequently fitted multi-group CFA models (MGCFA), in which self-reports 
and informant-ratings were specified as separate groups (latent trait variances were set unity in both 
rating types). In the first set of MGCFA models (for configural MI), no parameter equality 
constraints were applied, whereas in the second set residual correlations and in the third set (metric 
MI) also factor loadings were constrained equal. Scales were flagged for lack of configural MI 
when their models fit data more poorly than the respective baseline models, as indicated by a drop 
in CFI (ΔCFI) of at least .01, combined with increases in RMSEA and SRMR of at least .015 and 
.03, respectively (Cheung & Rensvold, 2002; Chen, 2007). Same fit-index-change-based criteria 
were applied for testing equality of residual correlations and metric MI, comparing each model with 
one step less constrained model. In the two subsequent sets of models, intercepts (for scalar MI) and 
then also residuals variances (for strict MI) were constrained equal across groups (in addition to all 
previous equality constraints), and again each model was compared to the corresponding previous, 
less constrained model, with  ΔCFI ≥ .01, ΔRMSEA ≥ .015 and ΔSRMR ≥ .01 flagging potential 
lack of the respective level of MI (Chen, 2007). Stricter ΔSRMR criteria for scalar and strict MI 
tests as opposed to other MI tests were proposed by Chen (2007) based on a simulation design.1 
Results 
For both self-reports and informant-ratings, the fit indices (chi-square, CFI, RMSEA, SRMR) for 
models with and without correlated residuals are reported in Electronic Supplementary Material 
(ESM). Before allowing for correlated residuals, the indices varied widely. For example, CFIs 
ranged from .54 to .96 (median .89) in self-reports and from .37 to .96 (median .90) in informant-
ratings, whereas RMSEAs ranged from .049 to .159 (median .091) in self-reports and from .043 to 
.204 (median .093) in informant-ratings. According to SRMRs, only N5: Impulsiveness and O2: 
Openness to Aesthetics failed to achieve acceptable fit. After allowing for correlated residuals, all 
model fit indices were satisfactory in self-reports, whereas CFIs ranged from .87 to .98 (median .96) 
and RMSEAs ranged from .039 to .127 (median 0.058) in informant-ratings (all SRMRs < .06). 
That is, in a few instances residual correlations that had been identified based on self-reports did not 
sufficiently improve model fit in informant-ratings according to CFIs and RMSEAs. Fit indices of 
the supplementary domain-models identified based on their 48 items (see ESM) were very poor 
(e.g., CFIs ranged from .41 to .65 and from .46 to .67, respectively in self-reports and informant-
ratings). This was expected because items of the same facets were designed to have residual 
                                                 
1 In order to test whether the adopted ΔCFI, ΔRMSEA and ΔSRMR criteria could have been too strict (falsely signaling potential lack 
of MI), we reran the steps above having randomly reshuffled the group indicator. There should not have appeared any evidence for 
the lack of MI and, indeed, none appeared. 
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correlations. We did not allow correlated residuals for these models because hundreds of them 
would have been required. 
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Table 1. Baseline model fit indices for FFM domains and their 30 facets. 
 Chi-square df CFI RMSEA SRMR 
N1: Anxiety 380.605 19 .966 .054 0.027 
N2: Hostility 354.478 19 .967 .052 0.029 
N3: Depression 472.943 19 .945 .061 0.040 
N4: Self-Consciousness 392.784 18 .949 .057 0.033 
N5: Impulsiveness 475.171 18 .941 .063 0.045 
N6: Vulnerability to Stress 511.074 17 .949 .067 0.034 
E1: Warmth 366.778 19 .957 .053 0.036 
E2: Gregariousness 468.112 19 .963 .060 0.031 
E3: Assertiveness 659.791 20 .944 .070 0.036 
E4: Activity 637.414 17 .952 .075 0.038 
E5: Excitement Seeking 314.738 19 .966 .049 0.029 
E6: Positive Emotion 526.318 19 .953 .064 0.036 
O1: Openness to Fantasy 694.716 19 .938 .074 0.042 
O2: Openness to Aesthetics 520.988 18 .963 .066 0.037 
O3: Openness to Feelings 280.304 18 .953 .047 0.029 
O4: Openness to Actions 260.174 17 .962 .047 0.028 
O5: Openness to Ideas 629.592 18 .948 .072 0.043 
O6: Openness to Values 295.797 16 .915 .052 0.037 
A1: Trust 317.739 18 .972 .051 0.033 
A2: Straightforwardness 669.332 19 .938 .073 0.049 
A3: Altruism 407.764 17 .942 .060 0.042 
A4: Compliance 282.626 18 .946 .048 0.031 
A5: Modesty 356.590 15 .971 .059 0.032 
A6: Tendermindedness 205.020 19 .966 .039 0.027 
C1: Competence 308.019 18 .960 .050 0.030 
C2: Order 452.875 18 .959 .061 0.034 
C3: Dutifulness 201.728 19 .968 .039 0.023 
C4: Achievement Striving 411.876 18 .960 .058 0.035 
C5: Self-Discipline 402.697 17 .962 .059 0.033 
C6: Deliberation 452.152 18 .953 .061 0.038 
Neuroticism 445.471 7 .970 .098 0.033 
Extaversion 266.557 7 .979 .076 0.024 
Openness to Experience 135.258 5 .982 .063 0.024 
Agreeableness 75.902 6 .991 .042 0.016 
Conscientiousness 192.632 6 .987 .069 0.022 
NOTE: df = degrees of freedom; CFI = Comparative Fit Index; RMSEA = Root Mean Square Error 
of Approximation; SRMR = Standardized Root Mean Square Residual. 
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Fit indices for the baseline models (fitted in collapsed self- and informant-ratings without 
specifying groups) are reported in Table 1. Model fit indices for all MGCFA models as well as 
ΔRMSEAs and ΔSRMRs are reported in the ESM. There was no strong evidence for any facet or 
domain lacking configural MI, except for the E1: Warmth facet and Agreeableness domains 
showing ΔCFI = .01 and the latter also showing an increase in RMSEA of .022. Constraining 
residual correlations equal did not cause deterioration in model fit, except for ΔCFI = .01 for O4: 
Openness to Actions and O6: Openness to Ideas.  
Eighteen facets and all domains but Extraversion were flagged for poor metric MI according to the 
ΔCFI criterion, although the deterioration of model fit was more than minor (i.e., ΔCFI > .01) only 
for four facets, O6: Openness to Values (ΔCFI = .03), A3: Altruism (ΔCFI = .04), A4: Compliance 
(ΔCFI = .03), and C1: Competence (ΔCFI = .02), and the Agreeableness domain (ΔCFI = .03). 
According to ΔRMSEA, only Agreeableness domain showed a minor lack of metric MI (ΔRMSEA 
= .018), whereas this was the case for seven facets (N2: Hostility, O1: Openness to Fantasy, A3: 
Altruism, A5: Modesty, C1: Competence, C2: Order, and C3: Dutifulness) and three domains 
(Openness, Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness) according to ΔSRMR (it only exceeded .03 for 
A3: Altruism, Agreeableness and Conscientiousness). Thus, except for all criteria converging on 
poor metric MI for Agreeableness, they varied in flagging other scales for the lack of this level of 
MI and in most cases fit deteriorations were minor. Therefore, factor loadings could be considered 
reasonably equivalent in self-reports and informant-ratings for all scales except, perhaps, for 
Agreeableness. 
However, according to the ΔCFI criterion, all 35 scales were flagged for potentially poor scalar MI. 
Although for five facets the drop in fit was minor (ΔCFI = .01), evidence for poor scalar MI was 
particularly noteworthy (ΔCFI > .10) for E1: Warmth, O6: Openness to Values and A3: Altruism 
and also notable (ΔCFI > .05) for N3: Depression, N5: Impulsiveness, O4: Openness to Actions, 
A4: Compliance, C2: Order, C3: Dutifulness, C6: Deliberation and Agreeableness. According to  
the ΔSRMR criterion, too, majority of facets and all domains failed to achieve scalar MI, although  
ΔSRMRs exceeded .01 for no more than nine facets and were above .02 for only E1: Warmth, O6: 
Openness to Ideas, and A3: Altruism. According to the ΔRMSEA criterion, ten facets and two 
domains failed to achieve scalar MI, with ΔRMSEA exceeding .02 for N3: Depression, E1: Warmth, 
O4: Openness to Actions, O6: Openness to Values, A1: Trust, A3: Altruism, C2: Order, C3: 
Dutifulness, C6: Deliberation and Agreeableness and being .02 for N5: Impulsiveness and 
Conscientiousness. All of these ten facets and Agreeableness had also been flagged by other criteria, 
suggesting potentially poor scalar MI for them.  
Seventeen facets were also flagged for potentially poor strict MI according to the ΔCFI criterion, 
although the evidence was more than marginal (ΔCFI > .01) for only O1: Openness to Fantasy, N4: 
Self-Consciousness, O3: Openness to Feelings, O6: Openness to Values, A4: Compliance, A6: 
Tendermindedness and C1: Competence. The  ΔSRMR criterion also flagged 12 of these facets for 
poor strict MI, as well as A3: Altruism and Neuroticism and Openness domains; however, ΔSRMR 
exceeded .01 only for O1: Openness to Fantasy and A4: Compliance. The ΔRMSEA did not 
highlight any scale as lacking strict MI. Overall, thus, most if not all scales showed an acceptable 
level of strict MI, had it not been for problematic scalar MI for many scales. 
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In the ESM, MGCFA results based on models allowing no residual correlations are also reported. In 
these analyses, according to the ΔCFI criterion N5: Impulsiveness showed clear lack for configural 
(ΔCFI = .10) and metric MI (ΔCFI = .28) alongside the other scales identified above as having 
ΔCFI > .01 for metric MI. Similarly to what was reported above, there was also evidence for a 
general lack of scalar MI (for 24 facets and all domains ΔCFI > .01), coupled with poor strict MI for 
a number of facets (for ten facets ΔCFI > .01). According to ΔRMSEA, only N5: Impulsiveness 
failed the configural and metric MI test, whereas only six facets (N3: Depression, E1: Warmth, O6: 
Openness to Values, A3: Altruism, C3: Dutifulness and C6: Deliberation) failed to meet the required 
level of scalar MI and all scales met strict MI. According to the ΔSRMR criterion, all scales 
achieved configural invariance, four facets (N2: Hostility, O1: Openness to Fantasy, A3: Altruism 
and C3: Dutifulness) and Agreeableness and Conscientious domains failed to achieve metric MI, 
only nine facets and no domain met scalar MI (only for three of them, ΔSRMR > .02) and 13 facets 
and Neuroticism and Openness domain showed some evidence for poor strict MI (mostly minor). In 
conclusion, when residual correlations were not allowed and models tended to be grossly mis-
specified there was generally similar evidence for (occasionally poor) MI.  
Finally, we tested for MI in (very poorly fitting and without residual correlations) domain-models 
specified based on 48 items rather than facet scores (see ESM for fit indices). According to the 
ΔCFI criterion, Neuroticism, Openness and Agreeableness marginally failed to achieve metric MI 
(ΔCFI), all five domains failed to achieve scalar MI (ΔCFI .02 to .05) and all domains but 
Neuroticism marginally failed to achieve strict MI (ΔCFI = .01). According to other criteria, all 
domains achieved all levels of MI. It therefore seems possible that such grossly mis-specified 
models are less sensitive to violations of MI. Such models may become less sensitive to further fit 
deteriorations.  
Discussion 
Do FFM domain and facet scales—as embodied in the NEO-PI-3, one of the most comprehensive 
and widely used personality questionnaires—measure the same constructs in self-reports and 
informant-ratings? There are theoretical reasons to consider the possibility that they may not, 
because the self and external raters may have access to different information about the target or they 
may bias their ratings in different ways (e.g., Vazire, 2010; McAbee & Connelly, 2016). However, 
the presented evidence suggests that self- and informant-ratings generally measure the same 
constructs—at least, to the extent that it matters in most applications. In most cases, researchers are 
interested in comparing the relative standings of individuals based on self-reports and informant 
ratings, be this by directly correlating the scores based on the two rating types (McCrae et al., 2004) 
or by comparing some findings based on them (e.g., Čukić et al., 2016; Mõttus et al., 2018). For 
such attempts, similarity of factor loadings (metric MI) suffices, and we found this to apply to most 
scales. Even for the scales that did not meet the metric MI threshold, the discrepancies in loadings 
appeared minor, being consistently pointed out by different criteria only for the Agreeableness 
domain scale.  
However, as has been noted in other instances (e.g., Mõttus et al., 2015), mean score comparisons 
of FFM traits and/or their facets may be complicated due to poor scalar MI. When this level of MI 
is not met, observed mean differences are at least partly not driven by the ostensible latent trait that 
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the scale constituents ought to define, but by the constituents themselves. For example, Allik and 
colleagues (2010) showed that informants generally ascribed people the same level of 
Agreeableness as  the target themselves did, but a closer look at the findings suggested that this 
trend was opposite for different facets of the Agreeableness domain. Therefore, an unqualified 
difference between the two rating types in mean Agreeableness domain scores could have been 
misleading. Moreover, given our evidence that several facets themselves (especially O6: Openness 
to Values) lack scalar MI themselves, the patterns reported by Allik and colleagues (2010) could 
have been even more nuanced than the authors considered at the time—driven by some specific 
items of the facets. Lack of scalar invariance may also complicate research based on differences 
between self- and informant-reported personality scores (e.g., McCrae, Mõttus, Hřebíčková, Realo, 
& Allik, in press). 
What is common to the scales that showed evidence for potentially poor MI: Depression, 
Impulsiveness, Warmth, Openness to Actions and Values, Trust, Altruism, Order, Dutifulness, 
Deliberation and Agreeableness? Vazire (2010) suggests that self-informant discrepancy in ratings 
may be moderated by traits’ evaluativeness, so one could expect that these scales have more 
evaluative content than others (see also Mõttus et al., 2014). Indeed, Agreeableness is among the 
most evaluative domains (alongside Conscientiousness) and Warmth, Altriusm and Dutifulness are 
highly evaluative facets (Allik et al., 2010), suggesting that their comparatively poor MI may result 
from different motivational biases in self- and informant-ratings. The other scales do not stand out 
as being among the most evaluative (Allik et al., 2010), but they may contain items that vary greatly 
in evaluativeness. Items of these scales may also vary in their level of observability, which might 
moderate cross-rater consistency (e.g., Mõttus et al., 2014). General rating biases such as 
acquiescence and extreme responding are less plausible explanations for why some scales show 
poorer MI than others. 
In conclusion, there appeared an acceptable level of invariance in how the FFM domains and facets 
were measured in self-reports and informant-ratings, given how data from these different sources 
are typically used. Informant-ratings provide a valuable complementary, and sometimes alternative, 
source of information and lack of MI with self-ratings is not something that should prevent 
personality researchers from relying on this information.  
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